by Jennifer C. Hunt

While I was working in the Training Division of the NYPD, I decided to test the sense of humor of a commander who worked in the Deputy Commissioner’s office at One Police Plaza downtown. He was one of those guys who wanted absolute control and lost his temper at the drop of a hat. I sent him an official 49 “through channels,” requesting a potbellied pig. I found the 49 on my computer today and thought I’d share it with you.

According to sources, the commander had a hissy fit when he read the 49. I don’t believe it. I suspect he had a fit in public but  then closed the door to his office and laughed out loud.

For some reason, the EDS number appears on the left hand corner when it should appear on the right. I can’t get it properly formatted as it is in the original 49. I wrote the telephone number of the sick desk as that of the EDS.

EDS 7607600 – 04

POLICE DEPARTMENT

CITY OF NEW YORK

June 3, 2004

From:        Commanding Office, Executive Development Unit

To:            Commanding Officer, Police Academy

Subject:     REQUEST FOR   MOUSE EATING POT BELLIED PIG

1.     It is requested that a mouse eating pot bellied pig be assigned to the Executive Development Section for the purposes of consuming the mice that inhabit the South side of the sixth floor of the Police Academy Building.

2.     Pot bellied pigs come in two varieties – man eating and mouse eating. The mouse eating variety is a friendly, low maintenance creature that has the intestinal fortitude to consume large quantities of mice in one sitting. During periods in which mice are not available as the major food source, the pig can thrive on very low quantities of scrap Mexican and Italian food, providing an ecologically sound method of disposing of garbage that would otherwise attract roaches and mice. In contrast to the domestic cat which harbors allergies for numerous persons, the pig is a clean, short haired animal that does not inspire allergic reactions.

3.    The pot bellied pig is quiet and will not disturb the patterns of work of the police officers in the building. Indeed, its industrious mouse eating temperament may inspire others to new levels of activity. There is a danger, however, that the animal will be subject to accusations of rate busting. We believe that adequate supervision under the auspices of the Executive Development Section will ensure the pig is spared undo torment. Furthermore, it is suspected that once the pig earns a reputation as being police friendly and reasonably cuddly, interpersonal problems will cease and adoption by the whole Police Academy staff will be formalized.

4.       For your CONSIDERATION.

JCH/jch                                                                                    Jennifer C. Hunt Ph.D

The report ordered by congress to assess HTS –Human Terrain Team System- has been released to the public.

To remind readers, HTS began as a controversial “proof of concept” defense contracting program around 2006. The first teams were sent to Afghanistan in 2007 and soon after that to Iraq. Their goal was to provide military commanders cultural information that would help them understand the world view, social structure, needs and desires and attitudes of the local population in order to “win their hearts and minds.”

By 2008, the program was undergoing a period of rapid expansion because, according to the former project director, Steve Fondacaro, the teams were so effective that “All of the brigade commanders wanted their own HTTs (human terrain teams)” as part of their counterinsurgency strategy.

The CNA report echoes Fondacaro’s claim when it suggests that the HTS is a “victim of its own success;” the rapid expansion of the program has resulted in an inability to recruit sufficient numbers of qualified personnel. According to the report, BAE contractors claim that they weren’t given enough time to vet and hire large numbers of qualified social scientists and military contractors to begin their training and go downrange.

Regardless of the reason, it’s clear that  a lot of people who were recruited to HTS were not interviewed, even by telephone or effectively vetted in any meaningful way. The result, to quote a friend, “[one thing that is lacking is] a simple …psychological screening process  that would eliminate the garden variety manic-depressives, psychotics, schizophrenics and (I am convinced of this) the occasional sociopath, that bopped into Leavenworth Kansas for HTS training. “

CNA researchers had only three months to do their analysis of HTS.  As a result of this and other factors, their findings appear limited, their methodology diffuse, their recommendations few, and many questions are left unanswered.

l. CNA does not clarify who was included in the sample of HTS personnel who they interviewed to gather their data. It remains unclear if “informants” were handpicked by higher ups in HTS management and possibly TRADOC in order to put the most positive spin on the program and hide some of its deficits.

2. The notion of “victim of its own success” as a result of rapid expansion suggests that the first teams to go to Afghanistan were successful. No evidence is provided to support that implicit claim. The only team that I understand worked well as a team and was effective downrange in 2008 was Afghan team 4 whose members encountered a tragedy that prematurely terminated their deployment (The assault on Paula Lloyd and the death of the Afghan national responsible).

3. Stories/rumors are mixed about Michael Bahtia’s team, another social scientist who was killed early in the program’s history. Bahtia was well qualified.  However, it appears that there was a lot of tension among his teammates that resulted in problems for all concerned.

4. The “model” first 2007 team that is most talked about in HTS training appeared to have had mixed success. Allegedly, the social scientist and team leader were constantly fighting and the social scientist rarely went outside the wire. I don’t know if this was true. There were at least two good people on that team. I don’t know what they did. I wonder if CNA questioned them and if they dared tell the truth.

5. During 2009-10, the period the report mostly covers, there have been some successful teams and/or highly productive individuals. There have also been troublesome incidents and some unfit persons in positions of leadership who remained in theater for long periods, causing misery to their team personnel. The dynamics of success and failure of teams are not explored in this report.

6. CNA mentions that an extraordinarily high number of persons leave the program early, while in training or shortly after deployment.  Some they dismiss as what I would confirm are “sociopaths” – persons who milked the system for what it was worth with no intention of going downrange. The reasons why other recruits voluntarily left in the middle of training or while downrange remain unexplored. CNA should have interviewed a sample of individuals who voluntarily resigned mid-training or while deployed to find out why.  I believe these interviews would have provided insight into the dynamics of the program.

7. The researchers take for granted that the individuals who were fired were fired for good cause i.e. “bad behavior.”  I am aware of at least three and maybe four firings that were not based on “bad behavior” by the relevant employees.  CNA should have tried to interview a sample of fired former employees to get the “story” straight. At least one I know is currently downrange on another contract and doing a very fine job.

8. CNA appears to think that the major problem in training is the primitive state of the classrooms. I suspect that that is and was the least of folks’ concerns. CNA should have realized this complaint was a cover for more important things going on like the relationship between what is taught in the classroom and what is needed downrange.  More than a few HTS veterans say the class on research methods is/was a waste of time; that the new seminar leader system doesn’t work to help trainees along; that the system of peer review is a failure; and that a lot of the other instruction “sucks” and is irrelevant. The program terminated the one piece of instruction that Iraq bound students loved – the Lin Todd organized Iraq regional studies classes.

9. I am aware that new training is planned. That may be why CNA left this area alone.

10. CNA suggests on p. 90 that “recruits are trained in a team environment and when deployed they work in a team environment.” This is not true.  Perhaps the new training will encourage teamwork. The training that existed from 2008-2010 did nothing of the sort. Indeed, I believe that the attitude of persons in certain levels of management likely increased divisiveness between social scientist and former military personnel in some classes.  Early in 2008 or before, it appeared that social scientists were put on a pedestal, creating a sense of resentment among military personnel. By August of 2008, social scientists were constantly demeaned by persons in positions of responsibility (the so-called ASOs who have since been replaced by seminar leaders).

11. The CNA researchers were told to study the structure of management but not the managers. The only thing they say about management is that the former Director, Steve Fondacaro blames TRADOC for the program’s ills.  People I know in the program recall Fondacaro bitching about BAE contractors as well. Another former HTS manager complained about TRADOC too and insisted that the program would be better off if it fell under DOD.

12. A friend who knows a great deal about the program’s history suggests that, indeed, “moving the program to DOD would not be a bad move…anything but TRADOC G2 but a better solution would be to put the project under the control of Army Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, NC. “They know how to vet people… to use the psychological screening program that would weed out those w ho don’t pack the emotional/mental gear to serve as a TEAM member in a combat zone.”

13. Regardless, for CNA to focus only on structure and ignore the lack of leadership in the program is to omit consideration of one of the most critical factors that has resulted in the problems in training and downrange as well as in the resignations of qualified personnel. In addition structure may relate to the lack of leadership in a way that the CNA researchers were unable to explore because the omitted consideration about particular managers and how they operate and what sort of expertise they bring to the field.

14. I don’t know what to believe. I hear that “things” might be improving since persons at TRADOC stepped in.

15. CNA provides a list of areas of expertise that are desirable for human terrain team personnel to know. While I pretty much agree with the areas that they stipulate for social scientists, I’m not convinced that the same background is required for other positions, like team leader and research manager.  In other words, I’m not sure everyone on a team needs a background in sociology, anthropology, political science, or international relations etc.

16. They do need to be open-minded. They must like and respect social scientists and the skills they have. They should understand the combat environment and help social scientists learn what they need to know to safely function in that realm. Most important, the team leader must understand and believe in the mission and know how to lead a mixed group, not through micromanaging, fear and intimidation tactics but by supporting the strengths of his people, treating them with respect, maximizing his and their resources, and helping his team do their job.  This also means recognizing that his or her people are human and have weaknesses too. It means helping compensate for weaknesses or providing an atmosphere where a supposed weakness can become an asset, if the person involved is essentially good.

17. To quote a friend, “Big Boy Rules.” A team leader gives his people a leash so they can do their jobs and also have fun. If they screw up more than once or badly, they go home.  That, I’m told, is the true meaning of the contractor’s expression “Big Boy Rules.” You are responsible for your own behavior and if you screw up, you go home.

18. CNA provides no evidence as to why and how and what dynamic existed among the teams that were successful in theater and got along and what went on among those who brigade or battalion commanders said failed.

I assume taxpayers paid for the CNA report. Unfortunately, it doesn’t say much about HTS that hasn’t been said before.  Furthermore, the decision to make HTS a permanent part of military operations (versus a proof of concept program), appears to have been made before the investigation began and the report submitted for review.

“The New York Police Department has informed the Federal Bureau of Investigation that it plans to pull all six of its detectives from a joint task force that investigates armed bank robberies” according to an article in the New York Times that mentions Paul Browne, the Deputy Commissioner Public Information and Phil Pulaski, the Chief of Detectives.

What’s up? Damned if I know.  The NYPD is claiming manpower shortages. There are an awful lot of detectives staring at computers in the Counterterrorism Division.

I don’t know if any new detectives have been made recently.

In general, however, the Department seems to be in stagnation mode.

There are no classes at the Police Academy.

No one gets transferred anywhere unless the P.C. personally approves the request.

Rookies are stuck for months in the housing projects with newly made supervisors in Operation Impact. Operation Impact was supposed to be temporary assignment that would lead to transfers into precincts where new officers could learn to be “real street cops” a long side their veteran peers.

Could be that Kelly has decided to cut off one more link with the FBI out of spite. Kelly and David Cohen appear to think they can do a better job handling Intelligence and terrorism issues on their own or with only minimal cooperation. Maybe they feel the same way about bank robberies and such.

Creating tension between the two agencies is something Kelly seems to be good at. On the other hand that explanation doesn’t make very much sense.

Then a lot of things that happen in the NYPD these days don’t make sense to me.

Chief Pulaski likes to put his spin on lots of things he doesn’t know much about in the detective division. He’s a bright guy with a few advanced degrees but he’s has mostly worked inside and has never been a detective.

I hear he sometimes makes things more complicated than they need to be – like by adding ten (exaggeration here) steps to a process that has only needs three or four and has worked that way successfully for years. In other words, why break what’s not broken to add  red tape, create more rules that put cops at risk if something goes amok, and that serves to micromanage every ounce of what they do, breaking their spirit in the process.

In his column, NYPD Confidential, Lenny Levitt confirms that Pulaski’s egomania is behind the transfers supported, of course, by the Police Commissioner. Levitt’s column (February 28, 2011) is quoted below:

“Sources say the prime mover is Chief of Detectives Phil Pulaski, whose ego is on the inner edge of out of control.In the early 2000s, before becoming Chief of Detectives, he headed the NYPD side of the Joint Terrorist Task Force. But, says sources, he did not have a very good experience with the FBI.

“When he [Pulaski] joined the JTTF, he told FBI managers that they now worked for him,” said a police source.

His experience worsened after he took home a federal laptop computer filled with classified information. The result was an internal investigation that no doubt contributed to his leaving the task force.

While Pulaski, who did not return a call from this reporter, may be out front in seeking to disband the task force, let’s remember that nothing occurs in the NYPD without the imprimatur Police Commissioner Ray Kelly.

As this column has reported over the past decade, Kelly also has little love for the FBI. And his ego is even farther out of control than Pulaski’s.”

THEE RANT writers see the situation in a slightly different way placing more emphasis on Ray Kelly’s decision making snafus rather than Pulaski’s overinflated ego:

In previous blogs about the T.V. series Bluebloods, I have suggested that the program appears to be an arm of the NYPD, reflecting a goody-two shoes version of the Ray Kelly- Paul Browne Department spin.

I have no evidence to suggest, much less prove, that the producers of Bluebloods have talked to Ray Kelly or Paul Browne and any suggestion to the contrary has been said in a sarcastic and/or facetious tone.

I’m beginning to think I am wrong. Perhaps there is a connection between Kelly and/or Paul Browne and the producers of Bluebloods.

Following the airing of a ridiculously biased and factually inadequate program on the National Geographic channel that glorified the counterterrorism efforts of the Kelly administration while ignoring its multiple failures (see NYPD Confidential by Lenny Levitt today), Bluebloods contributed a new episode that appears to attempt to accomplish much the same thing.

In Bluebloods, the P.C. gets together with the Deputy Commissioner, Counterterrorism to investigate the shooting of an undercover who is involved in a top secret investigation of a terrorist plot. Detective Bluebloods (Danny) is asked to take the case although he is in the major case squad and not in Intel.  It turns out that the shooting of the  undercover has to do with a girlfriend-boyfriend dispute rather than an effort to undermine the NYPD’s undercover counterterrorism operation. Indirectly this interpretation of the assassination attempt serves to criticize  the American’s notion of the Muslim treatment of women and the institution of arranged marriage.

However, the final message of the episode is in line with the National Geographic pitch – The NYPD Police Commissioner runs a picture perfect counterterrorism operation that protects our city without outside help from the FBI.

There is no mention that a van carrying bombs was allowed to enter and park in Time Square during the summer, despite the fact that a myriad of police officers are assigned to the area 24-7. The only reason that no one was hurt is that the bomb malfunctioned and some vendors notified the police when they saw the smoke. The FBI took over from there and arrested the suspect before he boarded a plane.

There’s also no mention of the serious plot that the NYPD nearly botched more than a year ago because Kelly wanted to function independently of the FBI and run the show.

Bluebloods is not helping this city deal with terrorism by recreating the mythology that surrounds the Kelly administration. A far more interesting episode could be created by revealing the flaws Kelly’s counterterrorism program contains and making Tom Sellick a kind of post-Kelly reform Police Commissioner, attempting to undo the mistakes of the past.

But maybe the T.V. program has a contract with the NYPD that forbids any in depth analysis and only allows the producers to write episodes that compliment the departmental spin.

Cartoon by Anthony Mair (“Mairboy”)

On Tuesday, 2/1/11, the NY Daily News reported that “In an embarrassing series of mistakes, cops from the NYPD’s elite Emergency Service Unit shot off three stray rounds in three months – including one in Rockefeller Center.” In one incident, a member of the sniper team discharged a round from his rifle while assigned to guard the lighting of the Xmas tree at Rockefeller Center, an area inundated with tourists. No one was injured. In a second incident, an ESU detective accidentally discharged a round from his shotgun when he was getting out of his truck or car while responding to a job involving a barricaded person in Harlem.

The latest incident, involving a veteran police officer, was reported in a previous blog and resulted in an injury to an elderly man during an entry into a Bronx apartment in which inhabitants were assumed to be in possession of drugs.  Apparently, the officer was trying to turn on his flashlight when he accidentally released the round. Perhaps he mistakenly had his index finger on the trigger instead of extended along the side of the Glock. When he squeezed his two middle fingers to turn on the “switching device” on the grip of the gun, he reflexively squeezed his index finger as well.

The NYPD dismissed the idea that the latter incident involved equipment failure as the officer’s mother initially claimed.

According to the Daily News, officers in ESU say the incidents are “the result of a cut in weapons training.” Apparently their week-long shooting exercise at Camp Smith or Fort Dix has been excised from their training routine.

Paul Browne, The Deputy Commissioner of Public Information, nicknamed by police reporter Lenny Levitt  “Mr. Truth,” denies that ESU training has been reduced. According to the quote in the Daily News, “ESU has never received more training than it has now, because of the terrorist incidents around the world and the fat that they are the front line of an NYPD response.”

In this case, Paul Browne may well be telling the truth in a cagey kind of way. There is no contradiction between an increase in the number of weeks of training on issues related to terrorism and a reduction in time spent in weapons training.

Below is a brief history of changes in firearms training for officers in ESU

l. Around 1986, when the unit was small, ESU officers went to the range 4 times a year for 2 days each for a total of 8 days annually. Sometimes in the late 1990′s this training was reduced to 4 times a year for 1 day each for a total of 4 days annually. Later, still in the late 1990′s, it was further reduced to 2 days annually.

2. I am not sure when the one week of tactical and weapons training at military bases was introduced to officers in ESU. However, I understand that that week of intensive training has indeed been dropped, probably sometimes after Ray Kelly became police commissioner in the wake of 9/11.

The importance of the reduction in training is important. The week of training at a military base allowed officers to spend a lot of time not only shooting their weapons and conducting tactical exercises but also handling their weapons in a safe and purposeful manner. Intensive repetition allows officers to commit certain practices to memory so that they’re automatically triggered whenever the officers handle their weapons.

What else has changed in ESU that might influence actions on the street?

l. The unit has been made into an entity unto itself, led by Chief Charles Kammerdener and is no longer part of the Special Operations Division.

2. The unit has undergone an expansion with the possible inclusion of less experienced officers, sergeants, lieutenants and Captains. A number of supervisors in Emergency Service were not cops in the unit and it takes time before they can familiarize themselves with what ESU officers do.

3. The unit has become the special weapons and tactical arm of counterterrorism in the Department, although it still handles the variety of rescue and SWAT work previously assigned.

4. The influx of new officers after 9/11 might have led to a transformation of the informal culture in the unit.Informal rules that were handed down through generations and served to temper aggressive behavior by placing superior emphasis on training, skill, common sense, expertise, and rules surrounding the use of lethal force  etc. may have been undermined.

One ESU veteran talked about his rookie year in the unit. He mentioned his memories of the first time that he had been involved in the execution of a warrant. The truck was dominated by old timers, each of whom the sergeant assigned a role in the entry. The sergeant then told the rookie officer, “You take the tools, watch what we do, and we’ll call you if we need you. You’re too new in the unit to do anything more unless we ask you.”

Nowadays this sort of training and socialization is unlikely to happen. There are far more rookies and less experienced “”veteran” officers than old timers handling jobs except in a very few trucks.

One former military officer and weapons specialist with considerable knowledge regarding issues of firearms training for police SWAT teams wasn’t surprised by the number of accidental  discharges in ESU in view of the infrequency of weapons instruction and practice. He was surprised by the paucity of weapons training in New York.”

“I’m shocked at the amount of firearms training that the ESU goes though.  Most SWAT/SRT teams shoot every single month, and have HUGE ammo budgets.  That’s handguns, shotguns, carbines, SMGs, and snipers.  LAPD D Platoon (their SWAT Team) really focus on weapons training….I’m not surprised [by the discharges]…considering how little team weapons training [NYPD ESU officers have].  It’s bound to happen, and will happen again, if they don’t rectify the situation.”

It’s worth noting here that ESU is not simply a SWAT team but also does an abundance of rescue work including using the Hurst tool to get people out of cars in which they are trapped following accidents. ESU worked the job involving a woman stuck under a crane, several years back. Some officers talked to her to keep her as calm as possible while other worked to get  her out from under the crane. ESU is also called on jobs involving mentally ill persons, particularly those who appear violent, and are trained to use a variety of less than lethal means to subdue them and get them to the hospital. Most SWAT teams only do SWAT work and do not have to have the training and experience in rescue and other tasks assigned to ESU.

5. Apparently, fewer individuals in ESU have the opportunity to practice their skills on the job, resulting perhaps in mistakes or lack of preparedness. There appear to be fewer trucks making warrant based (and other) entries. As a result, perhaps, of the policies of the current administration and its micromanaging leadership style, police officers and their supervisors are afraid to make decisions. The latter issue is complex and can not be dealt with in depth here.

Despite the relative lack of weapons training and other problems in the unit today, ESU has a comparatively low rate of lethal force incidents. I believe this is partly because of the attention the unit places on rescue and saving lives.Indeed, it’s testimony to the dedication of ESU officers to both rescue and SWAT work that there are as few accidental shootings as there are.

In addition to more weapons training, ESU officers would probably benefit from additional training in conjunction with members of the hostage negotiation team. There have been several incidents in the last year in which snafus developed as a result of a lack of coordination and/or tension between the two units, although none involved a legally bad shooting.